| Abstract | We utilize evolutionary game theory to studythe evolution of cooperative societies and the behaviors of
individual agents (i.e., players) in such societies. We present
a novel player model based upon empirical evidence from the
social and behavioral sciences stating that: (1) an individual’s
behavior may often be motivated not only by self-interest but
also by the consequences for others, and (2) individuals vary
in their interpersonal social tendencies, which reflect stable
personal orientations that influence their choices. Alongside
the formal player model we provide an analysis that considers
possible interactions between different types of individuals
and identifies five general steady-state behavioral patterns. We
present evolutionary simulations that ratify previous findings
on evolution of cooperation, and provide new insights on the
evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a society as
well as on the emergence of cooperative societies. Our main
experimental result demonstrates that in contrast to previous
common knowledge, increasing mutual reward or mutual
punishment in the Prisoner’s dilemma game does not result in
the same type of cooperative society: while increasing reward
does increase the society’s cooperativeness level, increasing
mutual punishment does not.
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